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METROPOLITAN GROWTH POLICIES AND 
NEW HOUSING SUPPLY: EVIDENCE FROM 
AUSTRALIA’S CAPITAL CITIES 
Ralph B. McLaughlin 
Lecturer, School of Natural and Built Environments, University of South Australia, GPO 
Box 2471, Adelaide, South Australia 5001, Australia. 
ABSTRACT: This paper empirically examines the relationship between house price 
change, metropolitan growth policies, and new housing supply in Australia‟s five major 
capital cities. Our hypothesis suggests capital cities with tighter regulations on new 
development will have fewer housing starts and price elasticities than those in less-
regulated markets. The empirical procedure used in this paper utilises the Urban Growth 
Model of Housing Supply developed in Mayer and Somerville (2000a and 2000b) and 
employed in Zabel and Patterson (2006) by using quarterly data on housing approvals and 
house prices from 1996-2010. Data on metropolitan growth policies in Australia is 
borrowed from Hamnett and Kellett (2007). Preliminary findings indicate that new 
housing supply in Australian capital cities is elastic to housing price changes, as a one per 
cent increase in prices leads to an approximately 4-6 per cent increase in housing 
approvals over five quarters. While this indicates a properly functioning housing market, 
the estimated elasticity is about a third of other developed countries, such as the United 
States. Furthermore, the use of established growth policies, such as urban growth 
boundaries and urban consolidation, appears to have a greater impact on new housing 
approvals than adoption of new-style growth policies, such as development corporations 
and infrastructure levies. However, both types of policies decrease new housing supply.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Much scholarly work on Australian housing markets centres on housing price 
trends and their determinants (Abelson, 1994; Maher, 1994; Bourassa and 
Hendershot, 1995; Murphy and Harley, 2003; Berry and Dalton, 2004; Abelson, 
Joyeux, Milunovich, and Chung, 2005), while relatively little work examines 
supply-side dynamics (Williams, 2000; Yates and Wulff, 2000; Yates, 2001; 
Wood, 2003; Berry, 2003). Furthermore, few studies empirically examine 
supply-side responses to increases in housing demand (Yates and Wulff, 2000). 
This is surprising, given that recent theoretical and empirical evidence suggests 
low housing supply elasticity may play an important role in the emergence of 
market bubbles and decreased housing affordability (Berry and Dalton, 2004; 
Glaeser, 2006; Glaser, Gyourko, and Saiz, 2008). 
Low housing supply elasticity could result from a number of factors. In 
Australia, two primary culprits are oft-blamed: land market intervention, and 
developer land banking. The former is usually targeted by representatives of the 
housing industry (Day, 2006), while the latter targeted by opponents of neo-
liberalism (Gleeson and Coiacetto, 2007; Beer, Kierans, and Pieters, 2007). Land 
market interventions are said to lower supply elasticity by restricting the pace 
and intensity of new development, while private land banking is blamed for 
reducing elasticity through monopolistic private ownership of large amounts of 
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developable land. 
In response to the perceived problems of private land banking and “economic 
surplus” of the development industry, the Whitlam Government established the 
Land Commission Program (LCP) in the early 1970s, and state governments in 
Australia formed public land corporations for the purpose of regulating the 
acquisition and release of land supply (Stretton, 1970; Troy, 1979; Gleeson and 
Coiacettto, 2007). Approximately twenty years later, urban consolidation and 
other metropolitan growth policies were hallowed across the country as solutions 
to problems of environmental and social sustainability. Both efforts involved 
removing large amounts of developable land around Australia‟s capital cities by 
different means: public land commissions achieved this by purchasing land from 
the private market, while metropolitan-wide policies preserved land through the 
use of various land regulations, such as urban growth boundaries, urban service 
limits, and non-urban zoning. Much criticism concerning large increases in 
Australian house prices have been directed towards these two efforts. However, 
there is little empirical evidence to verify housing price effects of such programs. 
This is perhaps enhanced by the complex nature of housing prices themselves.  
This paper takes an alternative approach to testing this argument by 
empirically examining the cumulative impacts of metropolitan growth policies 
on new housing supply. Specifically, we address three interrelated questions:  
(1)  What is the general supply elasticity of new housing in Australia over 
the past 15 years?  
(2)  Has utilisation of strong metropolitan growth policies affected the 
supply of new housing units? and  
(3)  Do impacts of such policies vary between older „established” policies 
vs. newer “innovative” policies? 
The following section reviews past and recent trends in housing studies and 
conditions in Australia, and lays out the advantages of using the urban growth 
model of housing supply for evaluations of metropolitan planning policies. 
Section 3 describes a theoretical and empirical model of new housing supply 
based on the urban growth model; section 4 discusses results from the empirical 
analysis; and section 5 concludes with policy recommendations and caveats. 
2. THE AUSTRALIAN HOUSING MARKET 
Over the past 40 years, housing issues in Australia have been a central focus 
of academics, politicians, industry players, and the general public alike. Much of 
this focus has centred on the interplay of government and urban planning 
policies, neo-liberalism, and housing affordability. Specifically, the major debate 
on housing affordability festers between government interventionists and neo-
liberals. On the left, proponents of government intervention argue the housing 
market, left to its own device, will lead to over-speculation, market instability, 
and generally unaffordable housing via the monopolistic tendencies of land and 
housing developers. On the right, neo-liberals argue urban planning policies 
reduce affordability by excessive restrictions on the supply of developable land 
through land market intervention, public land agencies, and high taxation. Both 
arguments have theoretical merit, although little empirical evidence exists to 
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vindicate either perspective. This lack of evidence is the primary motivation for 
this study. 
Urban economic theory suggests that, ceteris paribus, a reduction in the 
supply of developable land does not unambiguously lead to higher housing 
prices. This should be the same for any supply reduction, regardless of whether it 
originates from public agencies or monopolistic land speculators. However, a 
reduction in the supply of developable land must lead to higher land prices. And 
although land and housing prices are certainly correlated, an increase in land 
prices does not necessarily lead to higher housing prices. This is because land 
and capital are substitutable: when faced with higher land costs and a downward 
sloping demand curve, developers should theoretically use less land per housing 
unit and built more housing units per hectare of land. This substitution should 
occur at a rate that offsets the increase in land price. Thus, the end result of a 
supply-induced increase in land prices should be smaller housing units, but not 
necessarily more expensive housing units. This is the desired mechanism of 
urban consolidation efforts: to increase sustainable development and preserve 
open space by limiting the supply of developable land, while allowing 
developers and other government programs to increase the density of the built 
environment and housing choice, respectively.   
However in a socio-political landscape, existing residents are often opposed 
to increases in density within their communities. As such, local development 
plans and zoning codes typically reflect local not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) 
attitudes through the use of density and minimum lot size restrictions. As a 
result, the goals of increasing housing affordability and sustainability through 
urban consolidation policies can be at odds with local desires of urban form. 
Thus, what often results from initial efforts of urban consolidation are heavily 
regulated land markets with tight density restrictions on new development, both 
from state government reductions of new green field sites and local council 
density restrictions on existing brown field sites. In such a scenario, developers 
are prevented from making an efficient land/capital substitution, and the end 
result must be an increase in both land and housing prices. 
To complicate matters, comprehensive planning of land and housing markets 
can result in housing price increases from two independent market effects: a 
decrease in supply, due to restrictive zoning and development plans, but also 
from demand increases, which arises from improvements in the quality of the 
built environment. As a result, analyses of planning policies and house prices 
must take into account these separate effects. Failing to do so could misattribute 
the specific effects of a given policy. While quantifying the stock of housing 
supply is relatively straightforward, quantification of improvements in the 
quality of the built environment is quite difficult. Only a handful of studies 
address the prospective welfare gains from comprehensive planning schemes 
(Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002 and 2005), and even fewer empirical studies have 
attempted to estimate demand-side price effects (Egbu, Olomolaiye, and 
Gameson, 2007; Ihlanfeldt, 2009).  
Despite this empirical challenge, academic analyses of house prices (Abelson 
and Chung, 2005), housing policies (Berry and Dalton, 2004), and their 
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determinants (Abelson, Joyeux, Milunovich, and Chung, 2005) remain popular 
in Australian academic literature. This comes as no surprise, since recent house 
price appreciation in Australia has topped the list of developed countries (The 
Economist, 2003; Abelson and Chung, 2005). Even in the face of housing bubble 
concerns in the earl-mid 2000s (Berry and Dalton, 2004), house price indices 
continued to climb for all Australian cities. Furthermore, the robustness of the 
Australian housing market continued during the onset of the global financial 
crisis.  
Figures 1 and 2 show the Residex quarterly housing price index for the five 
major capital cities from 1993-2010 for homes and units, respectively. The 
picture for both detached homes and apartment units are similar: price 
appreciation was relatively smooth to the late 1990s, but rapid increases took 
hold in Sydney and Melbourne, followed by Brisbane in the early 2000s and 
soon after in Adelaide and Perth. While these figures show rapid increases, they 
do not take into account increases in income and inflation. Figures 3 and 4 better 
captures this, as they show increases in the price index relative to increases in 
weekly wages from the previous quarter, for houses and units, respectively. 
These figures show a less pronounced price increase compared to Figure 1 and 2. 
Even so, the price growth of housing relative to income increased dramatically 
from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s, followed by another sharp increase from 
2006-2007. Income increases gained significant ground on house prices only for 
two brief periods in the late 2000s. A simple comparison of house prices changes 
with average weekly wage changes between 1994-2010 best shows this 
discrepancy. For Adelaide, income grew by 72% while house prices grew by 
259%; income in Brisbane grew by 96% and house prices by 250%; income in 
Melbourne increased by 72% and house prices by 294%; income in Perth rose by 
102% and house prices by 323%; and income in Sydney grew 77% and house 
prices by 208%. Clearly, more than just increases in disposable income are 
driving house price appreciation.  
But what other factors might be driving these large price escalations? This 
has been a matter of debate in the academic literature, and scholarly evidence 
ranges from descriptive and speculative (Berry and Dalton, 2004), to inferential 
and inconclusive (Abelson et al, 2005). The speculative evidence suggests a 
number of causes for price appreciation, such as: declines in interest rates, 
increases in speculative residential investment, changes in land use regulation, 
tax subsidies for homeownership, and long term economic and demographic 
growth (Berry and Dalton, 2004; Abelson and Chung, 2005). The inferential 
evidence gives clues to which of these factors has played the most significant 
role (Abelson et al, 2005). For house price changes between 1970 and 2003, the 
largest impact was from changes in mortgage rates, where one point decrease in 
quarterly interest rates has historically increased house prices by 5.4 per cent. 
Income also plays a significant role, with a one per cent change in per capita 
income leading to a 1.7 per cent increase in prices. Most pertinent to the 
empirical approach in our study is the impact of housing supply. Abelson et al. 
(2005) estimate that a one per cent increase in the Australian housing stock leads 
to a 3.6 per cent decrease in housing prices. This finding suggests that the 
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Figure 1. House Price Index for Homes, 1993-2010 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. House Price Index for Units, 1993-2010 
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Figure 3. HPI-Income Ratio for Homes, 1994-2010 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. HPI-Income Ratio for Units, 1994-2010 
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addition of new housing supply could play a significant role in moderating 
escalating house prices. Furthermore, supply factors could play an even greater 
role today, as the estimates of Abelson et al. (2005) were computed from data 
only up to 2003 – well before the most recent run-up in housing prices.  
While studies of Australian housing prices are quite abundant, empirical 
analyses of supply are practically non-existent. This is by no means limited to the 
Australian context, as few scholarly efforts have addressed the theoretical or 
empirical determinants of new housing supply. The few existing studies 
primarily focus on determinants of the size of the housing stock, such as 
population, income, and household size, while very few empirically estimate 
supply-side elasticities. Moreover, an empirical model of new housing starts was 
only recently developed (Mayer and Somerville, 2000a) and tested empirically 
(Mayer and Somerville, 2000b; Zabel and Patterson, 2006). But no known use of 
this model has been employed to the Australian case. 
The advantages of using empirical models of housing supply elasticities are 
threefold. First, as described above, planning policies can influence prices by 
reducing supply and increasing demand. Bifurcating these two effects 
empirically is a difficult, if not impossible task. Using supply elasticities avoids 
this problem. Second, estimating new supply is not as vulnerable to measurement 
error as measuring housing prices. This is because house price indicators can 
vary tremendously depending on method of measurement: median and average 
prices can shift depending on the quality and quantity of homes sold during any 
period, and the quality of home sales data can vary drastically between sources 
because there is no standard definition of what constitutes housing prices 
(Abelson and Chung, 2005; Abelson and Joyeux, 2007). Alternatively, data on 
new housing approvals (which represents new supply) consists of 
straightforward counts on the number of new permits in a given area, and is 
reliably available from the ABS on a monthly basis. As such, we choose to 
estimate the impacts of metropolitan planning policies on new housing supply, 
rather than prices. 
3. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL MODEL OF HOUSING SUPPLY 
3.1 A Theoretical Narrative of New Housing Supply 
For purposes of this paper, the Mayer and Somerville (2000b) model of new 
housing supply is ideal as its conceptual underpinnings are based in urban 
growth theory. Urban growth theory postulates that the determinants of urban 
growth are best measured by changes, as opposed to levels, of such factors. In 
other words, the existing state of the universe is best predicted by shifts in the 
previous state of the universe, rather than the previous universe itself. For new 
housing supply, this is characterised by housing price changes as a superior 
predictor of new housing units compared to housing price levels. The following 
paragraphs describe the theoretical intuition. 
Imagine a large city that is neither growing nor shrinking, but rather exists in 
a steady-state with no major changes to population, income, or transportation 
costs. In this hypothetical city, housing prices reflect the overall wealth of city, 
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the number of people bidding for different housing types, and the costs of 
commuting. As it is a large city with higher than average income and number of 
residents, housing and land prices are relatively high compared to other areas but 
no new units are being demanded. Housing starts thus approach zero in such a 
city.  
Now imagine a small city where housing prices are much lower than the large 
city. Suppose a one-time increase in population occurs only in the small city. 
Demand for housing increases. Since housing is a complex durable good, new 
supply does not occur instantaneously (or even quickly) because of inherent lags 
in construction processes and planning approvals. In the short-run, house prices 
increase temporarily as new households bid up the price for land and housing. 
Developers take note of housing price increases and respond by building more 
units. Once enough new supply is provided to satisfy demand, house prices 
should fall close to pre-growth levels (though land prices will be slightly higher 
on a per metre basis to reflect an increase in scarcity).  
In each of these scenarios, housing price levels would not correctly predict 
increases in new supply. This is because a city can be large and expensive but 
also slow growing, as in the first scenario, and have relative few housing starts, 
while a small and inexpensive but fast growing town could have many starts. 
Price changes (increases), on the other hand, occur wherever demand shifts 
(increases), regardless of existing price levels. As such, models of new housing 
supply should be theoretically more robust when using price changes in place of 
price levels.  
In addition, a number of other geo-economic and institutional factors can 
affect the provision of new housing. Geographical and geological variations in 
the landscape can drastically alter construction costs. Cities in close proximity to 
shipping ports and/or large sources of raw materials will have lower 
constructions costs because of readily available inputs for new development, 
while areas with dramatic topographical features or unstable soils have higher 
constructions costs because of increased complexities in the building process. 
Furthermore, policies of governments and financial institutions can affect 
new housing supply. And although many of these policies are designed to 
influence housing demand, such as interest rates and homeowner tax breaks, 
several also affect the provision of new housing units. For example, increases in 
interest rates make financing new development projects more costly, and thus 
likely to reduce new residential supply. Local and state development plans also 
reduce the supply of new residential units by using regulations that reduce the 
intensity of new development, such as maximum density limits and minimum lot 
sizes. Additionally, most new development cannot occur without proper approval 
from local councils. Approval hearings can introduce delays and uncertainty into 
the development process, thereby making development riskier and less likely to 
occur (Mayer and Somerville, 2000b).  
Thus, to avoid estimation bias, all of these aforementioned factors must be 
controlled for in empirical models of housing supply. The following subsection 
intimately details such a model, which is derived from Mayer and Somerville 
(2000a and 2000b) and Zabel and Patterson (2006). 
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3.2 The Mayer-Somerville Empirical Model of New Housing Supply 
In many theoretical models of urban growth, new development occurs 
instantaneously. However, as mentioned above, there are various reasons why 
this is not an accurate reflection of the development process. Construction 
delays, development approvals, and geo-economic anomalies may create a lag 
between demand shocks and supply response. When lags exist, larger increases 
in demand lead to greater short-run increases in both land and housing prices. As 
a result, it is important to account for not only price changes in current periods, 
but also price changes in previous periods.  
The intuition is that developers, seeking to maximise profits, observe price 
increases in the housing market, and respond by providing new supply over the 
course of several time periods as they obtain building permits and mobilise 
resources for construction. In empirical models of housing elasticities, it is 
important to include an adequate number of time period lags to properly capture 
the delayed impacts of price changes. Evidence from Mayer and Somerville 
(2000a and 2000b) suggests that in the US, these lag periods range from three to 
five quarters. However, legal, economic, and institutional conditions are different 
in Australia. Although there are no known estimates of residential supply lags in 
Australia, Abelson et al. (2005) estimates Australian housing market prices 
adjust to equilibrium in approximately four quarters. As this estimate is similar 
to the lag period in Mayer and Somerville, we employ the more conservative 
structure of five quarters to allow for the possibility of longer adjustments to 
prices. 
In our model, the price change for each proceeding five quarters is included 
as an explanatory variable of new housing supply. Specifically, we use the log of 
the ratio of the house price index at time t relative to time t-1 to measure price 
change. This is analogous to the change in log prices, and allows interpretation 
as per cent house price change. We exclude the current quarter price change to 
avoid problems of endogeneity bias. If included, bias would arise because house 
prices and new housing supply are codetermined during a given time period: 
changes in new supply affect price, but changes in price also affect new supply. 
Excluding current quarter prices helps circumvent this problem, and is standard 
practice in models of housing supply, such as Mayer and Somerville (2000b) and 
Zabel and Patterson (2006). 
Furthermore, appropriate measurements of prices are an equally important 
matter. While many analyses of Australian housing markets use median or 
average housing prices, potential bias can occur with these measurements. This 
is because the distribution of homes sold at any moment is not constant. As such, 
prices are best measured using a quality-constant housing price index. Several 
such indices exist in Australia, and are produced from a variety of sources such 
as the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), RP Data, and Residex Pty. Each of 
these indices use variations of the repeat sales approach, which consist of 
calculations based on price appreciations of individual homes sales. A detailed 
description of the repeat sales approach can be found in Case and Shiller (1987). 
We choose to use Residex‟s publicly available index for capital cities, as their 
measure spans the entire universe of sales in a given quarter and is calculated 
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using a unique non-revisionary approach that does not require adjustments over 
time. The Residex HPI is then transformed to our housing price change variable 
by calculating the percent change in HPI from the previous quarter. 
In addition to housing prices, construction costs are also needed to control for 
inter-spatial and inter-temporal variations in the costs of raw construction 
materials. We obtain these figures from ABS‟s Producer Price Index (PPI) series 
for materials used in house building. This index is available quarterly for each 
capital city back to 1966. For interest rates, we use the Australian Reserve Bank 
cash rate that was in place at the end of the quarter. And finally, to measure new 
housing supply, we employ data on quarterly housing approvals also obtained 
from the ABS for each capital city. Descriptive statistics for housing approvals, 
as well as changes in construction costs, the HPI, and growth policy strength, are 
shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
City 
Quarterly HPI 
Growth Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mean SD 
Adelaide 1.02 0.02 1290 138.78 5.36 12 9 3 
Brisbane 1.02 0.02 2624 132.43 5.36 16 7 9 
Melbourne 1.02 0.02 5212 131.12 5.36 19 11 8 
Perth 1.02 0.03 3066 130.33 5.36 9 9 0 
Sydney 1.02 0.02 2628 139.05 5.36 24 11 13 
(1) Mean Quarterly New Housing Approvals 
(2) Mean Quarterly Construction Cost Index 
(3) Mean Quarterly Cash Rate 
(4) Metropolitan Policy Strength 
(5) Established Policy Strength 
(6) Innovative Policy Strength 
Source: HPI is available from Residex Pty; Housing approvals and construction costs 
from the ABS; cash rate from the RBA; and metropolitan growth policies from Hamnett 
and Kellett (2007). 
 
Furthermore, it is certainly plausible (and likely) that a number of other 
factors, both measurable and unmeasurable, could affect housing supply 
elasticities. Excluding these factors could introduce omitted variable bias, and 
the effects of our included variables could possibly exhibit spurious relationships 
with the excluded factors. However, many of these factors are not likely to 
change much over space or time, such as macroeconomic or national political 
climate (constant over space) or geographical anomalies (constant over time). As 
such, we choose to examine housing supply over 60 quarters (years 1996-2010) 
to take advantage of panel data procedures. Panel data techniques, such as 
population averaged OLS, random effects, and generalised-least-squares (GLS), 
employ a series of adjustments to control for the impacts of any omitted 
variables that are constant over space or time. Such techniques are described in 
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detail in Wooldridge (2001) and Cameron and Travedi (2009). As our analysis is 
most similar to Mayer and Somerville (2000b), we choose to closely follow their 
estimation procedures, which is described in the following subsection. 
3.3 Formal Model Specifications 
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper seeks to answer three key 
questions: (1) What is the general supply elasticity of new housing units in 
Australia over the past 15 years? (2) Do strong adopters of metropolitan growth 
policies affect the provision of new housing units? and (3) Does the effect differ 
between established growth policies and newer, supply oriented policies? The 
empirical model used here takes three different specifications to address these 
questions. The model specification used to address question 1 is the most parsi-
monious of the three, and is nested within the other two models. It appears as:  
Si,t = α + γt + β1ΔPi,t-1… β5ΔPi,t-5 + β6Ci,t + β7Ii,t + β8popi,87 + εi,t   (1) 
where Si,t is the quarterly number of new housing approvals, α is the constant, Ɣt 
is the quarterly dummy, ΔPi,t-q is the quarterly ratio of the house price index 
(HPI) to the previous period (HPIt/HPIt-1) where q=5, Ci,t is the quarterly 
construction cost index, Ii,t is quarterly RBA cash rate, popi,87 is the population 
for city i in 1987 to control for city size, and εi,t is the error term. 
To test for the cumulative impacts of urban metropolitan growth policies, we 
employ data from Hamnett and Kellett‟s (2007) classification of metropolitan 
planning tools employed in Australia‟s five largest capital cities. Their 
classification scheme ranks capital cities on the both the presence and strength of 
two classifications of growth policies: “Established Strategies,” which include 
policies such as urban growth boundaries and public land agencies, as well as 
“Recent Innovations,” such as infrastructure levies and fast-track planning 
systems. A summary of their classification is reproduced in Table 2.  
For the purposes of this analysis, we build a series of simple calculations of 
regulatory stringency at the metropolitan level based on these two classifications. 
The first measures the cumulative strength of metropolitan growth policy 
adoption. This measure, labelled MP, is based on the sum of adoption strength 
identified in Hamnett and Kellett, where No Policy = 0, Weak Policy = 1, 
Moderate Policy = 2, and Strong Policy = 3.  
For example, Adelaide scores a 12 for adoption strength, while Sydney 
scores 24. While the interpretation and scale is not linear (i.e., a score of 24 is not 
necessarily twice as strong as 12), we do believe it is a simple yet meaningful 
step in measuring the rigidity of land and housing markets in Australia. The 
cumulative model appears as:  
Si,t = α + γt + β1ΔPi,t-1… β5ΔPi,t-5 + β6Ci,t + β7Ii,t + β8popi,87 + β9MPi,t + εi,t   (2) 
where MP is included as an explanatory variable of new housing approvals. 
Our third test of metropolitan growth policies seeks to determine whether the 
impacts of “established” growth policies differ from newer “innovative” policies. 
Hamnett and Kellett (2007, p. 279) describe “innovative” policies as extensions 
of established policies that build upon past lessons in efforts to increase supply: 
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“The preliminary review of current metropolitan planning strategies ... 
suggests that it is premature to judge their likely outcomes but the trend 
appears increasingly to favour supply based policies, enthusiastically backed 
up by the development industry, which in its turn is expected to fund the 
infrastructure required for metropolitan growth.” 
 
Table 2. Adoption Strength of Metropolitan Growth Policies in Australia 
 
Ade-
laide 
Bris-
bane 
Mel-
bourne 
Perth 
Syd-
ney 
Established Policies (EP)      
Activity centres XX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
Corridor planning XX XX XXX XXX XX 
Public land agency role X O X X XX 
Urban consolidation XX XX XX XX XXX 
Urban growth boundaries XX O XX O X 
Innovative Policies (IP)      
Development Corporation O O O O XX 
Expand land supply O XX XXX O XX 
Fast track planning systems O XX XXX O XXX 
Infrastructure levies O XX O O XXX 
New co-ordinating authorities O O XX O XXX 
Overarching strategic plan XXX XXX O O O 
O = No policy in place; X = Weak policy; XX = Moderate policy; XXX = Strong policy 
Source: Hamnett and Kellett (2007). 
 
So from an empirical perspective, stronger adoption of newer, “innovative” 
policies should be associated with increases in housing supply. We measure the 
strength of adoption of both established and innovative metropolitan growth 
policies in a manner similar to our measurement of MP. To accomplish this, we 
bifurcate MP into two separate measures: EP, which measures established 
policies, and IP, which measures innovative policies. For example, this gives 
Melbourne an EP score of 11 and an IP score of 8. Substituting EP and IP for 
MP in equation 2 yields:  
Si,t = α + γt + β1ΔPi,t-1… β5ΔPi,t-5  
 + β6Ci,t + β7Ii,t + β8popi,87 + β9EPi,t + β10IPi,t + εi,t   (3) 
We estimate all three equations using a semi-log structure by calculating the 
natural logarithm of both housing approvals and the ratio of price changes. This 
allows interpretation of the price change coefficients as true elasticities, where a 
per cent change in housing prices leads to a per cent change in housing 
approvals. All other variables are included using their original, unlogged values. 
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3.4 Estimation Procedures 
As the data and model structure used in this paper is similar to Mayer and 
Somerville (2000a and 2000b) and Zabel and Patterson (2006), we adopt similar 
estimation procedures. We estimate equations (1) to (3) using three separate 
techniques: Pooled Feasible Generalised Least Squares (PFGLS), Feasible 
Generalised Least Squares with heteroskedasticity and autoregressive adjusted 
error terms (FGLS-HAR1), and Feasible Generalised Least Squares with 
heteroskedasticity and panel-specific autoregressive adjusted error terms (FGLS 
- HPSAR1). 
While fixed effects and random effect models are popular procedures for 
analysis of panel data, we avoid these estimators for two reasons. First, fixed 
effects require the explanatory variables be heterogenous over time. Since our 
models include a time-constant measure of metropolitan growth policies and 
population, use of the fixed-effects model prohibits estimation of the MP, EP, 
and IP variables. Second, the random effects procedure is inappropriate when 
using panel data with relatively few cases and many time periods. As our data 
contains only five cities over 60 quarters, we follow the recommendations of 
Wooldridge (2001) and Cameron and Travedi (2009) for long, narrow panel data 
and employ FGLS estimators. 
The FGLS-HAR1 and FGLS-HPSAR1 estimators are preferred because they 
correct for heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation. Heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation can arise when the error terms of panel data are non-constant 
over space and time, respectively. While presence of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation does not necessarily bias the coefficient estimates, the standard 
errors can be skewed. To account for this, we use the FGLS-HAR1 procedure, 
which uses a heteroskedastic and autoregressive error structure. Furthermore, use 
of panel data is also susceptible to serial correlation of the error terms within 
panels (in our case, each capital city). This occurs when error terms from one 
time period are correlated with future or past time periods but vary in structure 
for each city. As such, we estimate the FGLS-HPSAR1 specification, which uses 
heteroskedastic and panel-specific autocorrelation adjustments for each capital 
city‟s error term. 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Results 
Tables 3 to 5 present the regression results. Table 3 contains the results for 
equation 1, which includes regression of log housing approvals on 5 quarter lags 
of house price changes, constructions costs, and the current quarter ABS cash 
rate. Quarterly dummies are suppressed for simplicity of presentation, and are 
available from the author upon request. Column 1 contains the results from the 
PFGLS model, column 2 the FGLS-HAR1 model, and column 3 the FGLS-
HPSAR1 model.  
In the PFGLS model, the first 4 price changes are significant at below the .01 
level, and suggest that a one per cent change in housing prices leads to a 5.8 per 
cent increase in housing approvals over the next 4 quarters. Construction costs 
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and population are insignificant, while the cash rate is significant and negative at 
below the .10 level and suggests a one point increase in the cash rate decreases 
new housing approvals by 31 per cent. Estimates from the FGLS-HAR1 model 
are similar but more robust, with 1 per cent increase in prices exhibiting a 4 per 
cent increase in approvals. Construction costs, the RBA cash rate, and 
metropolitan population are all significant at below the .01 level: a one point 
increase in the construction cost index and cash rate is associated with a 4 per 
cent and 53 per cent decrease in new approvals, respectively, and a larger 
population is associated with higher levels of new housing approvals. Results 
from the FGLS-HPSAR1 specification are almost identical. 
 
Table 3. Housing Approval Regression Results: Equation 1 
Estimates PFGLS 
FGLS-
HAR1 
FGLS-
HPSAR1 
ln(∆Pricet-1) 1.318 0.637 0.648 
 (2.64) (1.77) (1.80) 
ln(∆Pricet-2) 1.279 0.798 0.801 
 (2.46) (1.90) (1.89) 
ln(∆Pricet-3) 1.158 0.902 0.956 
 (2.61) (2.15) (2.26) 
ln(∆Pricet-4) 2.082 0.955 0.976 
 (2.22) (2.29) (2.32) 
ln(∆Pricet-5) 1.965 0.751 0.761 
 (1.54) (2.03) (2.07) 
Construction Costs -0.022 -0.042 -0.043 
 (1.31) (7.07) (7.13) 
Cash Rate -0.307 -0.528 -0.544 
 (1.86) (7.57) (7.70) 
Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.47) (6.46) (7.84) 
Observations 285 285 285 
Prob > chi
2
 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR(1) Rho - 0.869 - 
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of quarterly housing approvals.  Coefficients 
on quarterly dummies not shown – full results are available upon request from the author; 
absolute values of z-scores are shown in parentheses below coefficients. Italicized, bold, 
and bold italicized represent significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Housing Approval Regression Results: Equation 2 
Estimates PFGLS 
FGLS-
HAR1 
FGLS-
HPSAR1 
ln(∆Pricet-1) 1.318 0.660 0.701 
 (2.63) (1.92) (2.10) 
ln(∆Pricet-2) 1.278 0.843 0.765 
 (2.47) (2.12) (1.97) 
ln(∆Pricet-3) 1.158 0.844 0.869 
 (2.62) (2.13) (2.25) 
ln(∆Pricet-4) 2.081 0.898 0.906 
 (2.22) (2.27) (2.35) 
ln(∆Pricet-5) 1.964 0.646 0.621 
 (1.54) (1.84) (1.83) 
Construction Costs -0.022 -0.031 -0.032 
 (1.30) (5.11) (5.30) 
Cash Rate -0.307 -0.414 -0.432 
 (1.85) (5.93) (6.18) 
Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (3.10) (7.84) (7.13) 
Metropolitan Policies (MP) -0.165 -0.158 -0.155 
 (3.31) (6.17) (5.37) 
Observations 285 285 285 
Prob > chi
2
 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR(1) Rho - 0.863 - 
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of quarterly housing approvals.  Coefficients 
on quarterly dummies not shown – full results are available upon request from the author; 
absolute values of z-scores are shown in parentheses below coefficients. Italicized, bold, 
and bold italicized represent significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
 
Equation 2 includes all variables from equation 1 plus the MP variable, 
which is the measure of metropolitan growth policy adoption strength; see Table 
4. In the PFGLS specification, a one per cent change in prices leads to a 5.8 per 
cent increase in housing approvals over the following 4 quarters. Construction 
costs are again insignificant, while a one per cent increase in the RBA cash rate 
significantly decreases new approvals by 30 per cent. Cities with large 
populations permit significantly more new units than smaller cities. The MP 
variable is significantly negative, which suggests stronger adopters of metro-
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politan growth policies have less housing approvals than weak adopters. The 
effect is quite pronounced, as a one point shift in the adoption strength scale 
decreases new housing approvals by 16 per cent.  
Results from the FGLS-HAR1 model are also similar, and suggest a one per 
cent increase in prices leads to a 3.9 per cent increase in new housing approvals, 
a one point increase in the construction costs index and cash rate decreases new 
approvals by 3 per cent and 41 per cent, respectively, and larger cities permit 
significantly more units than smaller cities. Additionally, a one point increase in 
MP is also associated with a 16 per cent decrease in new approvals. In the FGLS-
HPSAR1 specification, the impacts of price changes, construction costs, the cash 
rate, population, and MP are virtually identical to those in the FGLS-HAR1 
specification.  
Table 5 reports results for equation 3. It includes all variables from equation 
1 plus the EP and IP variables that measure the strength of established policy 
adoption and innovative policy adoption respectively. In the PFGLS 
specification, a one per cent increase in prices is associated with a 4.51 per cent 
increase in new housing approvals. Construction costs are insignificant, while a 
one point increase in the cash rate decreases new construction by 31 per cent, 
and larger cities approve significantly more units than smaller cities. Both EP 
and IP significantly decrease new housing supply, as a one unit increase in the 
strength of policy adoption is associated with 23 per cent and 18 per cent fewer 
housing approvals.  
Moving on to the FGLS-HAR1 model, a one per cent increase in prices is 
associated with a 4 per cent increase in housing approvals. A one point increase 
in construction costs and the cash rate significantly decrease new housing 
approvals by 3 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively. As in other specifications, 
larger cities permit significantly more units than smaller cities. Again, strong 
adopters of both EP and IP approve significantly less housing units, as a one unit 
increase in EP or IP is associated with 24 per cent and 18 per cent fewer 
approvals. As with estimation of equations (1) and (2), the FGLS-HPSAR1 
specification yields comparable results to the FGLS-HAR1 model. 
4.2 Discussion 
Overall, the results paint a clearer picture of housing supply elasticities and 
metropolitan growth policies in Australia than previously available. In contrast to 
studies by Abelson et al. (2005) and Berger-Thompson and Ellis (2004), we find 
housing supply is indeed elastic. Our estimates suggest supply elasticity in Aus-
tralia is approximately 3.9 to 5.8 over 5 quarters. While this indicates an elastic 
housing market, there are few empirical benchmarks to compare these results. 
Existing estimates of housing supply elasticities using the Mayer-Somerville 
model are from the US, where supply elasticity is much greater and in the order 
of 18 per cent for nationally aggregated data, while Mayer and Somerville 
(2000b) find elasticity to be around 15 per cent for metropolitan areas. The 
results from our model are more closely aligned to Zabel and Patterson‟s (2006) 
estimates for California cities, where a 1 per cent increase in housing prices leads 
to a 3.1 per cent increase in new housing permits over 8 quarters. 
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Table 5. Housing Approval Regression Results: Equation 3 
Estimates PFGLS 
FGLS-
HAR1 
FGLS-
HPSAR1 
ln(∆Pricet-1) 1.322 0.681 0.746 
 (2.56) (1.97) (2.23) 
ln(∆Pricet-2) 1.281 0.911 0.941 
 (2.42) (2.29) (2.43) 
ln(∆Pricet-3) 1.158 0.857 0.875 
 (2.62) (2.16) (2.27) 
ln(∆Pricet-4) 2.081 0.907 0.922 
 (2.22) (2.29) (2.39) 
ln(∆Pricet-5) 1.962 0.648 0.621 
 (1.54) (1.84) (1.82) 
Construction Costs -0.022 -0.027 -0.020 
 (1.28) (4.37) (3.16) 
Cash Rate -0.306 -0.377 -0.305 
 (1.82) (5.21) (4.07) 
Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (3.69) (7.67) (8.56) 
Established Policies (EP) -0.230 -0.248 -0.331 
 (2.00) (4.85) (6.59) 
Innovative Policies (IP) -0.184 -0.183 -0.214 
 (4.21) (6.49) (6.87) 
Observations 285 285 285 
Prob > chi
2
 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR(1) Rho - 0.859 - 
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of quarterly housing approvals.  Coefficients 
on quarterly dummies not shown – full results are available upon request from the author; 
absolute values of z-scores are shown in parentheses below coefficients. Italicized, bold, 
and bold italicized represent significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
 
Furthermore, interest rates have a rather large impact on new housing 
approvals. A typical RBA cash rate increase of 0.25 per cent would lead to a 7.5-
10.75 per cent decrease in new housing approvals. Note that this effect is in 
addition to the decrease in housing demand that results from individual mortgage 
payments increases, which is captured by the price change variables.  
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Of importance in this paper are the estimated effects of metropolitan growth 
policies. The results show that a one unit increase in the strength of metropolitan 
growth policies reduces new supply by approximately 16 per cent. These 
findings are not dissimilar from Mayer and Somerville‟s (2000b) estimates of 
growth management policy adoption in the US, where an additional growth 
management policy decreases new housing permits by approximately 7 per cent. 
Furthermore, the impact of metropolitan growth policy adoption seems to be 
about 30 per cent greater for established growth policies, rather than new 
innovative policies. Both types of growth policies decrease new housing 
approvals, with established and innovative policies lowering new supply by 25 
per cent and 18 per cent, respectively. While both negative, the greater 
magnitude effect of established policies does support Hamnett and Kellett‟s 
(2007) claim that the newer “innovative” policies were supply oriented. Still, the 
cumulative impact of such policies is correlated with fewer new housing 
approvals. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical model of housing supply in 
Australia, and uses quarterly data for the five primary capital cities to estimate 
supply elasticity and effects of metropolitan growth policies on new housing 
approvals from 1996-2010. In contrast to other housing supply studies in 
Australia, the UK, and US, we find that housing supply is indeed elastic, 
although elasticities in Australia appear to be on the order of 70-80 per cent less 
than similar studies conducted in the US, and adjustment periods approximately 
0-2 quarters longer. 
We also find significant effects from strong implementation of metropolitan 
growth policies. Cumulatively, it appears that stronger adopters of such policies 
approve less new houses than weaker adopters, controlling for changes in prices, 
construction costs, interest rates, and population. Furthermore, it appears that the 
effects are about 30 per cent greater for “established” growth policies, such as 
urban growth boundaries and urban consolidation, than for newer innovations 
like land supply monitoring and strategic planning. While these measures of 
growth policies are rudimentary at best, they are an intriguing first glimpse at the 
empirical effects of strong land use regulation in Australia. 
So what do these results imply about the Australian housing market? Is 
Australia‟s recent and substantial rise in housing prices resultant of supply 
restrictions? While not absolute, our findings indicate that price increases may 
stem from more than just changes in economic fundamentals. This is supported 
by the relatively low supply elasticity compared to the US housing market. 
While Mayer and Somerville (2000b) also find that supply adjusts to price 
changes after 5 quarters, the magnitude is three to five times the supply response 
rate in Australia. This could be due to a combination of factors. First, land 
developers could be restricting supply in monopolistic tendencies to drive up 
prices. While little empirical evidence exists on the matter, this has been 
championed as a major justification for the use of public land agencies to 
improve supply and increase affordability. On the other hand, not all 
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development occurs at the urban fringe, where developers typically land bank. It 
also occurs on redeveloped land, within urban areas. Rather, supply restrictions 
could result from local NIMBYist resistance and local council downzoning of 
existing land. This factor is equally as plausible, as recent metropolitan growth 
policies have focused on encouraging infill development within existing urban 
centres. Our results also support the latter possibility, as we find stronger 
adopters of metropolitan growth policies provide less new housing than weaker 
adopters. More intensive local backlash could arise in metropolitan areas that 
encourage infill projects, as is exemplified by the emergence of NIMBY groups 
like Save our Suburbs in Melbourne.  
As with any empirical analysis, there are a number of caveats that arise from 
the results. First, we judge the supply elasticity estimates to be low compared to 
the US. This benchmark comes from the only other known country where the 
Mayer-Somerville model has been applied. Without a third benchmark, it is 
difficult to determine if supply elasticities in Australia are exceptionally small, or 
wether elasticities in the US are exceptionally large. Judging by the most recent 
oversupply of housing in the US, the latter is quite plausible. Second, our 
measures of metropolitan growth policies are rudimentary at best. The actual unit 
of measurement – strength, as evaluated by Hamnett and Kellett – has no 
numerical meaning. Therefore, we cannot confidently estimate the precise 
magnitude of adopting stronger growth policies, nor are our findings applicable 
to the impact of specific policies themselves. And third, our analysis is 
conducted at the metropolitan level, and therefore ignores the heterogeneity of 
local council planning policies that may be endogenous to the growth process. 
For instance, stronger adopters of new metropolitan planning innovations may do 
so in response to a lack of housing supply incurred by restrictive local councils. 
Since our measure of such policies is time invariant, we could be misattributing 
the effect to innovative policies when indeed they may simply have been enacted 
because of existing low housing supply.   
In response, we lay out a number of items in need of future research. In order 
to better evaluate supply elasticities, there needs to be more international 
research on housing supply using the stock-flow adjustment approach so that 
better relative comparisons can be made. Second, more detailed analyses of 
metropolitan growth policies, their goals, and implementation dates is needed so 
that changes in policy adoption can be used as natural experiments. This way, 
growth policies can be evaluated over time and space. And last, a comprehensive 
analysis of local council planning policies and outcomes are needed to properly 
control for potential endogenous effects of metropolitan policies. Despite these 
caveats, our results do suggest that low elasticity – whatever their cause – may 
have played a role in Australia‟s house price escalation over the past 15 years. 
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